BOOK PROJECT
Thinking Fast and Slow in Alliance Politics
In this book, I apply the constructivist and behavioralist approaches to the long-standing question at the intersection of foreign policy decisions, international institutions, and global security governance: given international law on the use of force, what explains US allies’ decisions to join US-led military operations that lack the UN Security Council’s authorization to use armed force (and violate international obligations) or stay out (and comply)? I argue that the key explanatory factor is the degree of contestation in action knowledge across two levels of analysis: 1) individual level and 2) social level, of which the individual actor under study refers to for plausible action. In the particular security context, I argue that—at the least—three pre-existing foreign policy beliefs, concerning the effectiveness of 1) bilateralism with the United States, 2) multilateralism through international institutions, and 3) the use of force in achieving national security objectives make up the relevant action knowledge. For space reasons, I share the two-level ideational conditions under which joining [or, compliance] choice would likely be generated through the logic of habit (my arguments also address the other logics of instrumental, normative, and motivated rationality).
I argue that when pre-existing beliefs on the effectiveness of bilateralism with the United States are stronger than those of multilateralism and there is strong belief in military effectiveness [or, when beliefs on the effectiveness of multilateralism are stronger than those of bilateralism and there is weak belief in military effectiveness] across both individual and social levels, then joining [or, compliance] choice would seem like a ‘natural’ action to take. Alternative choices are never considered to be ‘real’ options. One of the unique empirical aspects of my research is that I systematically, and rigorously, measure the various logics of action by drawing upon over four decades of research in the cognitive sciences. Employing a cross-national, multi-methods research design, I find consistent and robust evidence for my two-level ideational argument, against the existing alternatives.
WORKING PAPERS
1. “What exactly is the logic of habit in IR theory, how would one know it, and why does it matter?”
In this paper, I clarify the sociological action concept of the logic of habit and provide various measurement standards for the different logics of action, including the logic of habit. I highlight the explanatory role of action knowledge across both the individual and social levels of analysis, and situate it within the other existing explanatory variables in IR theory.
2. “Sociological Choice Theory: Types of Bias and Certainty in Choice.”
This paper offers a micro-foundational sociological theory of choice, which subsumes the classical expected utility theory of choice. It lays out three major components of the sociological choice theory and explicates its theoretical and practical implications for international relations. I argue that the sociological-choice approach explains not only the final choices of interest but also the types of bias and certainty in choices as well as the kinds of decision-making process.
3. “Explaining US Allies’ Joining Behaviors: Cross-National Mixed-Methods Evidence from the UK and ROK.”
What explains the US allies’ decisions to join US-led military operations that lack the UN Security Council’s authorization to use armed force (and violate international obligations) or stay out (and comply)? My arguments highlight the explanatory role of three pre-existing understandings across individual and social levels of analysis. These include the beliefs in the effectiveness of 1) bilateralism with the United States, 2) multilateralism through international institutions, and 3) the use of force in achieving national security objectives. I focus on two US allies—United Kingdom (UK) and Republic of Korea (ROK)—as they are vastly different from one another, and so, any similar findings from critical empirical tests would enhance the generalizability of my substantive theory of US allies’ joining behaviors.
4. “On Coordination of the Huawei 5G Ban: An Ideational Theory of 5G Policy Preferences.”
US coordination with allies over foreign policy towards China seems more critical than ever. This paper focuses on coordination over the Huawei 5G ban and explains observed variation in the US allies’ responses. Specifically, this paper argues that the following three pre-existing ideas matter: 1) China poses a threat to national interest, 2) cyberspace needs security, and 3) data privacy needs protection. If these three beliefs are strong, then allied governments will likely adopt the US-requested Huawei 5G ban. On the other hand, if these three beliefs are weak, then allied governments will likely not adopt the ban. I demonstrate my argument with the divergent response choices of Australia and the Republic of Korea.
Thinking Fast and Slow in Alliance Politics
In this book, I apply the constructivist and behavioralist approaches to the long-standing question at the intersection of foreign policy decisions, international institutions, and global security governance: given international law on the use of force, what explains US allies’ decisions to join US-led military operations that lack the UN Security Council’s authorization to use armed force (and violate international obligations) or stay out (and comply)? I argue that the key explanatory factor is the degree of contestation in action knowledge across two levels of analysis: 1) individual level and 2) social level, of which the individual actor under study refers to for plausible action. In the particular security context, I argue that—at the least—three pre-existing foreign policy beliefs, concerning the effectiveness of 1) bilateralism with the United States, 2) multilateralism through international institutions, and 3) the use of force in achieving national security objectives make up the relevant action knowledge. For space reasons, I share the two-level ideational conditions under which joining [or, compliance] choice would likely be generated through the logic of habit (my arguments also address the other logics of instrumental, normative, and motivated rationality).
I argue that when pre-existing beliefs on the effectiveness of bilateralism with the United States are stronger than those of multilateralism and there is strong belief in military effectiveness [or, when beliefs on the effectiveness of multilateralism are stronger than those of bilateralism and there is weak belief in military effectiveness] across both individual and social levels, then joining [or, compliance] choice would seem like a ‘natural’ action to take. Alternative choices are never considered to be ‘real’ options. One of the unique empirical aspects of my research is that I systematically, and rigorously, measure the various logics of action by drawing upon over four decades of research in the cognitive sciences. Employing a cross-national, multi-methods research design, I find consistent and robust evidence for my two-level ideational argument, against the existing alternatives.
WORKING PAPERS
1. “What exactly is the logic of habit in IR theory, how would one know it, and why does it matter?”
In this paper, I clarify the sociological action concept of the logic of habit and provide various measurement standards for the different logics of action, including the logic of habit. I highlight the explanatory role of action knowledge across both the individual and social levels of analysis, and situate it within the other existing explanatory variables in IR theory.
2. “Sociological Choice Theory: Types of Bias and Certainty in Choice.”
This paper offers a micro-foundational sociological theory of choice, which subsumes the classical expected utility theory of choice. It lays out three major components of the sociological choice theory and explicates its theoretical and practical implications for international relations. I argue that the sociological-choice approach explains not only the final choices of interest but also the types of bias and certainty in choices as well as the kinds of decision-making process.
3. “Explaining US Allies’ Joining Behaviors: Cross-National Mixed-Methods Evidence from the UK and ROK.”
What explains the US allies’ decisions to join US-led military operations that lack the UN Security Council’s authorization to use armed force (and violate international obligations) or stay out (and comply)? My arguments highlight the explanatory role of three pre-existing understandings across individual and social levels of analysis. These include the beliefs in the effectiveness of 1) bilateralism with the United States, 2) multilateralism through international institutions, and 3) the use of force in achieving national security objectives. I focus on two US allies—United Kingdom (UK) and Republic of Korea (ROK)—as they are vastly different from one another, and so, any similar findings from critical empirical tests would enhance the generalizability of my substantive theory of US allies’ joining behaviors.
4. “On Coordination of the Huawei 5G Ban: An Ideational Theory of 5G Policy Preferences.”
US coordination with allies over foreign policy towards China seems more critical than ever. This paper focuses on coordination over the Huawei 5G ban and explains observed variation in the US allies’ responses. Specifically, this paper argues that the following three pre-existing ideas matter: 1) China poses a threat to national interest, 2) cyberspace needs security, and 3) data privacy needs protection. If these three beliefs are strong, then allied governments will likely adopt the US-requested Huawei 5G ban. On the other hand, if these three beliefs are weak, then allied governments will likely not adopt the ban. I demonstrate my argument with the divergent response choices of Australia and the Republic of Korea.