BOOK PROJECT
Thinking Fast and Slow in Alliance Politics
In this book, I apply the constructivist and behavioralist approaches to the long-standing question at the intersection of foreign policy decisions, international institutions, and global security governance: given international law on the use of force, what explains US allies’ decisions to join US-led military operations that lack the UN Security Council’s authorization to use armed force (and violate international obligations) or stay out (and comply with the UN charter)? I argue that the key explanatory factor is the degree of contestation in action knowledge across two levels of analysis: 1) individual level and 2) social level, of which the individual actor under study refers to for plausible action. In the particular security context, I argue that—at the least—three pre-existing foreign policy beliefs, concerning the effectiveness of 1) bilateralism with the United States, 2) multilateralism through international institutions, and 3) the use of force in achieving national security objectives make up the relevant action knowledge. For space reasons, I share the two-level ideational conditions under which joining [or, compliance] choice would likely be generated through the logic of habit (my arguments also address the other logics of instrumental, normative, and motivated rationality).
I argue that when pre-existing beliefs on the effectiveness of bilateralism with the United States are stronger than those of multilateralism and there is strong belief in military effectiveness [or, when beliefs on the effectiveness of multilateralism are stronger than those of bilateralism and there is weak belief in military effectiveness] across both individual and social levels, then joining [or compliance] choice would seem like a ‘natural’ action to take. Alternative choices are never considered to be ‘real’ options. One of the unique empirical aspects of my research is that I systematically, and rigorously, measure the various logics of action by drawing upon over four decades of research in the cognitive sciences. I focus on two special US allies—Republic of Korea (ROK) and United Kingdom (UK)—as they are vastly different from one another and so, any similar findings from the cross-national critical empirical tests would enhance the generalizability of my theory of US allies’ joining [or compliance] behaviors. Employing a cross-national, multi-methods research design, I find consistent and robust evidence for my two-level ideational argument, against the existing alternatives.
WORKING PAPERS
1. “Who Supports the Huawei 5G Ban? Advancing two-level ideational approach in International Relations.” US coordination with allies over foreign policy toward China seems more critical than ever. This paper focuses on the coordination over the Huawei 5G ban and explains observed variation in US allies’ responses. Specifically, this paper argues that the following three, pre-existing ideas matter: 1) China has aggressive intentions, 2) cyberspace requires security, and 3) data privacy needs state protection. If these three beliefs are strong across both national leader and national security institutional levels of analysis, then allied governments will likely adopt the Huawei 5G ban. If these three beliefs are weak, however, then allied governments will likely not adopt the ban. I demonstrate my argument with the divergent choices of Australia and South Korea. Available upon request.
2. “What exactly is the logic of habit in IR theory, how would one know it, and why does it matter?”
In this conceptual/theory paper, I clarify the sociological action concept of the logic of habit and present an integrative, sociological-choice framework. Although the sociological-choice approach is at the general level and can be applied to any choice context, I apply it to IR theory and derive implications for theory and policy. Available upon request.
3. “Measuring the Logics of Action in International Relations.” This “empirical habit” paper provides both experimental and observational measurement standards for the different logics of action in the study of IR, including the logic of habit. I use ‘conflict detection hypothesis’ from the thinking and reasoning field of the cognitive sciences and develop original, text-based measures focusing on two dimensions of bias.
4. “Explaining US Allies’ Joining Behaviors: Cross-National Mixed-Methods Evidence from the ROK and UK.”
What explains the US allies’ decisions to join US-led military operations that lack the UN Security Council’s authorization to use armed force (and violate international obligations) or stay out (and comply)? My arguments highlight the explanatory role of three pre-existing understandings across individual and social levels of analysis. These include the beliefs in the effectiveness of 1) bilateralism with the United States, 2) multilateralism through international institutions, and 3) the use of force in achieving national security objectives. I focus on two US allies—Republic of Korea (ROK) and United Kingdom (UK)—as they are vastly different from one another, and so, any similar findings from critical empirical tests would enhance the generalizability of my theory of US allies’ joining [or compliance] behaviors.
Thinking Fast and Slow in Alliance Politics
In this book, I apply the constructivist and behavioralist approaches to the long-standing question at the intersection of foreign policy decisions, international institutions, and global security governance: given international law on the use of force, what explains US allies’ decisions to join US-led military operations that lack the UN Security Council’s authorization to use armed force (and violate international obligations) or stay out (and comply with the UN charter)? I argue that the key explanatory factor is the degree of contestation in action knowledge across two levels of analysis: 1) individual level and 2) social level, of which the individual actor under study refers to for plausible action. In the particular security context, I argue that—at the least—three pre-existing foreign policy beliefs, concerning the effectiveness of 1) bilateralism with the United States, 2) multilateralism through international institutions, and 3) the use of force in achieving national security objectives make up the relevant action knowledge. For space reasons, I share the two-level ideational conditions under which joining [or, compliance] choice would likely be generated through the logic of habit (my arguments also address the other logics of instrumental, normative, and motivated rationality).
I argue that when pre-existing beliefs on the effectiveness of bilateralism with the United States are stronger than those of multilateralism and there is strong belief in military effectiveness [or, when beliefs on the effectiveness of multilateralism are stronger than those of bilateralism and there is weak belief in military effectiveness] across both individual and social levels, then joining [or compliance] choice would seem like a ‘natural’ action to take. Alternative choices are never considered to be ‘real’ options. One of the unique empirical aspects of my research is that I systematically, and rigorously, measure the various logics of action by drawing upon over four decades of research in the cognitive sciences. I focus on two special US allies—Republic of Korea (ROK) and United Kingdom (UK)—as they are vastly different from one another and so, any similar findings from the cross-national critical empirical tests would enhance the generalizability of my theory of US allies’ joining [or compliance] behaviors. Employing a cross-national, multi-methods research design, I find consistent and robust evidence for my two-level ideational argument, against the existing alternatives.
WORKING PAPERS
1. “Who Supports the Huawei 5G Ban? Advancing two-level ideational approach in International Relations.” US coordination with allies over foreign policy toward China seems more critical than ever. This paper focuses on the coordination over the Huawei 5G ban and explains observed variation in US allies’ responses. Specifically, this paper argues that the following three, pre-existing ideas matter: 1) China has aggressive intentions, 2) cyberspace requires security, and 3) data privacy needs state protection. If these three beliefs are strong across both national leader and national security institutional levels of analysis, then allied governments will likely adopt the Huawei 5G ban. If these three beliefs are weak, however, then allied governments will likely not adopt the ban. I demonstrate my argument with the divergent choices of Australia and South Korea. Available upon request.
2. “What exactly is the logic of habit in IR theory, how would one know it, and why does it matter?”
In this conceptual/theory paper, I clarify the sociological action concept of the logic of habit and present an integrative, sociological-choice framework. Although the sociological-choice approach is at the general level and can be applied to any choice context, I apply it to IR theory and derive implications for theory and policy. Available upon request.
3. “Measuring the Logics of Action in International Relations.” This “empirical habit” paper provides both experimental and observational measurement standards for the different logics of action in the study of IR, including the logic of habit. I use ‘conflict detection hypothesis’ from the thinking and reasoning field of the cognitive sciences and develop original, text-based measures focusing on two dimensions of bias.
4. “Explaining US Allies’ Joining Behaviors: Cross-National Mixed-Methods Evidence from the ROK and UK.”
What explains the US allies’ decisions to join US-led military operations that lack the UN Security Council’s authorization to use armed force (and violate international obligations) or stay out (and comply)? My arguments highlight the explanatory role of three pre-existing understandings across individual and social levels of analysis. These include the beliefs in the effectiveness of 1) bilateralism with the United States, 2) multilateralism through international institutions, and 3) the use of force in achieving national security objectives. I focus on two US allies—Republic of Korea (ROK) and United Kingdom (UK)—as they are vastly different from one another, and so, any similar findings from critical empirical tests would enhance the generalizability of my theory of US allies’ joining [or compliance] behaviors.